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**CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES – USCCB**

**ETHIOPIA PROGRAM**

**FIELD SECURITY PLAN**

**March 2018**

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# **INTRODUCTION**

The purpose of the Field Security Plan (FSP) is to outline the Catholic Relief Services’ Ethiopia Program’s (CRS/ET) policies and procedures for the safety and security of all CRS employees. The FSP is designed to be relevant for both crisis situations as well as routine and daily operations. In this document the term "staff” refers to both international and national staff unless clearly indicated one way or the other. In addition, this plan is a guide to conducting a safe and orderly response in case an emergency does arise.

The FSP will be updated on an annual basis, or more frequently as necessary, in order to account for changes in the local context, and to include new contact names or numbers. Updates are based on institutional knowledge and advisories, publications and meetings with the Government of Ethiopia (GoE), diplomatic missions, including the US Embassy, and CRS partners. New staff members will be briefed on these procedures as a part of their orientation, and all staff will be advised of any changes.

The FSP is managed and updated by the CRS/ET Head of Operations (HoOps) in consultation with the Security Advisor who is designated as the CRS Security Focal Point for the Ethiopia Program. The HoOps and Security Advisor are the CRS/ET point persons for all safety and security related accidents and incidents, as well as the in-country clearinghouse for security information. The FSP is available to CRS staff by hard copy in the CRS/ET Offices as well as through the CRS Intranet by accessing the CRS Safety and Security Portal home page (<https://global.crs.org/communities/Security/Pages/default.aspx>). The FSP is complimented by the Security and Orientation Briefing Document that contains concise and contextual specific information for CRS and non-CRS visitors to the Ethiopia program, including newly arriving CRS/ET international staff. The Security and Orientation document is updated periodically throughout the year given the changing context and high volume of visitors and is also available to CRS staff on the security portal.

# **OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT**

Ethiopia, located in the “Horn of Africa” is a very large (435,071 square miles) land-locked country with the 2nd largest population on the African Continent), predominantly rural, agrarian-based population. Although Ethiopia has remained relatively politically stable over the past years, it is surrounded by countries of varying stability, particularly in the 20th century. There are many factors which contribute to the current safety and security environment (both the relative stability as well as the potential threats), however the political-religious history coupled with current population growth and economic conditions, remain as the perhaps as some of the most salient factors.

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is a developing country in East Africa. It is comprised of nine regional states and two city administrations (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa). The capital is Addis Ababa. Tourism facilities can be found in the most populous regions of Ethiopia, but infrastructure is basic. The ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front Party maintains strong control of the government and economy. Despite recent years of economic growth, the country remains vulnerable to external economic shocks and recurring drought.

From Biblical times up until the mid-20th century, the land comprising modern day Ethiopia was ruled under a tribal-based monarchic system of government, ending in 1974 with the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie. A period of communist dictatorship, known as the Dirgue Regime followed, until it was overthrown in 1991 by the current centralized Government of Ethiopia. Unlike most other African nations, Ethiopia was never colonized, although for a brief five-year period, parts of Ethiopia were occupied by the Italians just prior to WWII. In addition to a long history of relatively stable and unbroken governance, Ethiopia has also maintained a strong sense of religious tradition. Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic country with a diversity of religions, with Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity, Sunni Muslim, and Christian Evangelical/Pentecostal comprising the main religious groups.

The population of Ethiopia has doubled every 20 years, going from 35 million during the 1980s famines to an estimated 102.4 million in 2016 according to the World Bank. Although 90% of the population is agrarian, there has been considerable urban growth and resulting sprawl, particularly in the capital, Addis Ababa. The current population of Addis Ababa, a city with rapidly growing infrastructure, is estimated at 5 million inhabitants. As result of the high population density, hygiene and sanitary conditions are poor, traffic patterns are very complicated and overcrowding is the norm.

CRS established its presence in Ethiopia nearly 60 years ago. Throughout this time, the agency has enjoyed strong relations both with the local government and our partners. CRS is a highly respected agency and enjoys this status in part because of its focus on its high-quality work and avoidance in the political aspects of Ethiopian society.

Amid growing unrest and anti-government protests across Oromia and Amhara regions, the

the Government of Ethiopia declared a six-month state of emergency in effect in February 2018. The state of emergency allows law enforcement officers to detain anyone suspected of violating ‘the constitutional order’ and expands ability to search suspected houses, cars and individuals. The expanded authority of law enforcement officials includes but is not limited to: possession or consumption of certain media, illicit communication, participation in protests or strikes, attendance at illegal gatherings, communication with foreign or international organizations, and violation of curfews. The Government of Ethiopia has restricted or shut down internet, cellular data and phone services during and after civil unrest.

# **THREAT ASSESSMENT**

This assessment is designed to provide a brief, broad overview of the most salient threats to the wellbeing of the CRS/ET program and its employees. More details and specific examples related to these potential and actual threats are available from embassy websites, regular updates from the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) and UN security related updates.

## **Direct Threats**

**War:** Over the past ten years, Ethiopia has engaged in open hostilities with two of its neighboring countries: Eritrea and Somalia. The incursion into Somalia ended in 2009 and border tensions with Eritrea began to recede in 2007/8. At present, the GOE is not actively engaged in war activities but the Ethiopian military remains active and alert.

**Terrorism:** There are no known international terrorist groups based in Ethiopia that operate outside the country. However, al-Shabaab and al-Qaida do operate in the region and have an interest in targeting areas within Ethiopia. There are several indigenous groups, including the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) that target Ethiopian interests; however, these groups are not formally recognized outside of Ethiopia as terrorist organizations. Over the past few years there have been a few, sporadic bomb attacks against petrol stations, public transport vehicles and market places. The GoE attributed these infrequent attacks to the above mentioned indigenous groups.

**Civil Unrest:** Public political demonstrations in Ethiopia are rare. Most public demonstrations tend to be peaceful. However, in 2005, a public demonstration against the government escalated into violence, resulting in injuries and deaths of a large number of civilians. In addition, the unrest did affect CRS operations at that time, blocking traffic to and from the office.

**CRS Image & Specific Threats against CRS:** As mentioned in the introduction, CRS enjoys a strong and favorable image in Ethiopia, including with the GoE, within the international community, and with its Catholic partners. Although a minority religion, the Catholic Church, as with most faith based entities, has a favorable position in the Ethiopian context. In addition, anti-American sentiment in most parts of Ethiopia is minimal. Ethiopians enjoy a strong and favorable connection with America as a result of a large population of Ethiopian Diaspora living within the continental U.S.

## **Health Care & Treatment**

Staff, particularly international staff, can be susceptible to critical illnesses and diseases such amoebic dysentery and food poisoning. Addis Ababa is not a malaria zone but precaution should be taken when traveling to the Ethiopian lowlands. Sudden disasters, such as fires, epidemics and road accidents also can present serious risks to physical safety. In the event that any of the above should occur to staff, proper health care and treatment can be a critical recourse.

Unfortunately, quality medical care is a serious problem throughout Ethiopia. The availability of qualified physicians, including dental and mental health care, is extremely limited. The U.S. embassy only assigns personnel here who are free of serious or chronic health problems. Most internationals will be “medi-vac’d” for serious conditions. The health care situation is marginally better in urban areas; however, hygiene standards are poor and most providers lack quality supplies and medication.

Medical Emergency: Health facilities are very limited and are considered adequate only for stabilization and emergency care. Most of the available hospitals in Addis Ababa suffer from inadequate facilities, outdated equipment, and shortages of supplies/medications. All facilities require a cash deposit (dependent on the type of medical condition) before admittance and forbid medical release until all accrued charges are paid. There is a shortage of physicians and other qualified medical personnel. Emergency assistance is limited. Some hospitals have ambulance services, but these are limited, unreliable, and require on-scene cash payment.
Travelers must carry their own supplies of prescription drugs, preventive medicines and a doctor's note describing the medication. Contact information and recommended hospitals are as follows:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Hospital Name  | Telephone Number(s)  | Physical Address |
|  | 251-92-910-5653 | Bole sub city, Kebele 01, H.No-1244 |
| Myung sung Christian Medical Center (AKA KOREAN Hospital)Use for Trauma | 251-11-629-54200913-81-8801 | Gerji, Bole Sub-city, Kebele 11  |
| Black Lion | +251-11-515-6186+251-11-551-1211 | Near Dilachin Monument/Churchill Road |
| Nordic Medical Center. 24/7 Internal medicine and surgery | +251-913818801/939810618 | Bole around Rwanda Embassy close to Sunshine apartment |
| St. Yared Hospital  | 251-11-645-4697/06251-11-6454718 | CMC road 800 meters from Megenagna Square. Addis Ababa |
| International Cardiovascular Hospital  | 251-11-442-4680 /81 | At Confusion Corner, off Ethio-China Road behind Nile Insurance |
| Addis Cardiac Hospital  | 251-11-618-0709251-11-63-4720. | On right side the Ring Road from Bole to Saris in front of the customs office of Bole airport |
| Gojeb Dental Clinic  | 251-11-56-6521 / 6296 | Adjacent to United Printing Press, Piazza |
| Pediatric clinic  | (011) 551-4696 or (092) 178-7120 /(091) 280-3368 | Olympia, Between La Parisian Cafe and Dreamliner Hotel  |

## **Driving & Traffic**

Traffic accidents, coupled with poor health care, are the greatest threats to CRS staff. The risk of traffic accidents is high as a result of the following:

* A high prevalence of pedestrians randomly crossing and walking within roadways—as there are few sidewalks;
* Local driving practices can tend towards hazardous behaviors: cell phone usage, drinking and driving, lack of knowledge and enforcement of basic safety and driving practices, erratic driving patterns, etc. The government requires drivers to wear seat belts and forbids driving under the influence of alcohol and using cell phones while driving, amongst other negative practices. Enforcement of these laws is; however, erratic;
* Road hazards abound, including abundant livestock, even in major roadways, poorly lit areas, slow moving or stalled vehicles and “push carts;”
* The overall condition of roads, even in the cities, is poor and related infrastructure is weak. In Addis Ababa there has been heavy investment in major road construction that has resulted in many poorly maintained diversions. Road work particularly on major arteries can last several years, and the sections under construction tend to be more dangerous than they were prior to construction;
* Traffic police tend to be relatively untrained in terms of traffic control, focusing more on traffic violations. In the event of an accident, law enforcement does not generally favor the motorist, particularly when pedestrians are involved.
* Ethiopia is the host government for African Union (AU) and as a result there a high preponderance of international diplomatic missions. When the missions and GoE have travel arrangements for meetings or other events, major roads are blocked exclusively for VIP travel. Blockages occur particularly from the Bole Airport through Meskel Square to the major hotels (Sheraton and Hilton) and also through to AU headquarters affecting Mexico Square and Old Airport. Road blockages also occur for religious holidays and events such as the great run. There is no public address to advise other travelers as to when and where these blockages will occur, which forces motorists into poorly maintained side roads in more questionable neighborhoods.

Fortunately, within metropolitan areas, the confluence of many of these conditions often prevents higher speeds so traffic accidents frequently tend to be minor. However, this is not the case in rural areas.

**Overall Road Safety & Road Conditions:** According to the World Health Organization (WHO), Ethiopia has the highest rate of traffic fatalities per vehicle in the world. Roads are poorly maintained, inadequately marked, and poorly lit. Road travel after dark outside cities is dangerous and discouraged due to hazards posed by broken-down vehicles in the road, pedestrians, stray animals, and the possibility of armed robbery. Road lighting is inadequate at best and nonexistent outside of cities. Excessive speed, unpredictable local driving habits, pedestrians/livestock in the roadway, and the lack of adherence to basic safety standards for vehicles are daily hazards. There are vehicles unlicensed, and many drivers lack basic driver training or insurance. Emergency services are limited or nonexistent in many parts of the country and drivers should always carry spare tires, fuel, and tools on long trips, as there is no roadside assistance.

Be cautious when traveling on roads. In 2014, there were reports of highway robbery, including carjacking, by armed bandits outside urban areas in the Gambella region and improvised explosive devices deployed in Beneshangul. When driving, be wary of other motorists warning you of a mechanical problem or a flat tire. This may be a ruse by thieves to get you to stop. Be alert and aware of your surroundings to ensure that you are not being followed.

If you are driving CRS /ET or own vehicle, always have your car keys ready as you approach your car and be on the lookout for individuals who are waiting close to your car, especially at Bole Airport. Move directly from your car to your destination. Check the front and rear seats of your vehicle before entering and lock your doors immediately after entry. Maintain awareness when entering and exiting your vehicle. While in a vehicle, keep your doors locked and the windows rolled up. Keep bags, purses, and valuables out of sight to prevent theft. Do not carry unnecessary items in your bag. Do not open your doors/windows to give money to beggars, which are prevalent in Addis Ababa. Do not allow others to control your movement. Always leave enough space between you and the car ahead so that you can take evasive action. As explained above, it is unlawful to use a cell phone or other electronic communications device (even hands-free) while driving, and the use of seat belts is required. Be sure to carry a valid Ethiopian driver’s license, proof of comprehensive third-party insurance coverage, and your passport or Ethiopian Identification card. Try to park in guarded, illuminated areas at night.

If you are involved in a vehicular accident, a large crowd may gather and could become hostile and aggressive. If you fear for your safety, go to the nearest police station. Special units of the traffic police investigate traffic accidents. Normal investigative procedures require the police to conduct on-scene investigations, after which all involved parties go to the Traffic Department for a vehicle inspection and to provide details about the accident for a final report. If possible, obtain the names and contact information of all persons involved in the accident and make a note of the extent of any injuries; photograph vehicular damage; note any registration information (tag number) of other vehicle(s) involved; and obtain the other driver’s permit data. Give similar information or registration/permit data to the other driver and to the police upon request.

Public transport is unregulated and unsafe. If travelers do use public transport, they should use taxis, not minibuses, or large buses and ensure they are the only passengers in the vehicle. U.S. citizens should avoid, if possible, using public transportation and transportation hubs. A light rail system began operations in the capital city in late 2015 and there have been no safety or criminal incidents reported. Beware of unattended baggage or packages left in any location, including in taxis.

## **Crime & Police Response**

Although incidents of crime, both petty and aggravated, remain comparatively low, there have been reports of an increase over the past few years. It is possible this is a result of disproportional increase of the youthful population in conjunction with a decrease in employment opportunities.

There have been some reported burglaries and robberies targeting internationals in Addis Ababa during the past year. Firearms are rarely reported in the commission of a crime in Addis Ababa; local criminals' "preferred weapons" include physical force and knives. In the few cases where robberies have occurred and investigation has been concluded, the robbery is almost always considered to be an “inside job” and/or the perpetrator had some prior connection to the residence or residents.

Petty crimes such as pick pocketing, mugging and stealing small items from parked cars have also increased especially after dusk. There have been some reports of armed robbery in rural areas. One of the biggest open-air markets (Merkato) in Africa is located in Addis Ababa. As in any large market, non-violent criminal activity targeting expatriates is prevalent in Merkato. There have also been reports of expatriates being targeted by criminals outside shops selling tourist trinkets and other venues of tourism interest.

## Police / Security

The Ethiopian Federal Police (EFP) is responsible for crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of federal courts, including any activities in violation of the Constitution that may endanger the constitutional order, public order, hooliganism, terrorism, trafficking in persons, and transferring of drugs. The EFP also maintains law and order in any region when there is a deteriorating security situation beyond the control of the concerned regional government and a request for intervention is made by the regional government or when disputes arise between two or more regional governments and the situation becomes dangerous for the security of the federal government. The EFP safeguards the security of borders, airports, railway lines/terminals, mining areas, and other vital institutions of the federal government. The EFP delegates, when necessary, its powers to regional Police Commissions; counterterrorism (CT) when investigations may lead to criminal arrests or charges within the court system.

Police response in Addis Ababa is reasonable relative to other cities on the continent. The GoE police tend to be honest and cooperative in their dealings with expatriates. However, many police officers are unable to speak English effectively. However, if one is patient they will do their best to assist and will eventually bring an English-speaking officer to translate.

* 1. Kidnapping Threat

Travelers should be cautious when traveling in/along Ethiopia’s border with Somalia where there is an ongoing kidnapping threat to foreigners by Al-Shabbab.

Criminal violence and political violence in Addis Ababa and in southwestern and southeastern Ethiopia has resulted in numerous injuries and deaths. In January 2012, five European tourists were killed and four were kidnapped in an apparent terrorist attack/kidnapping plot in the Danakil Depression area (near the border with Eritrea). A kidnapping threat against Westerners has been active in the Dolo Odo area of the Somali Region in since 2013.

* 1. Religious/Ethnic Violence

Since late November, widespread, ongoing demonstrations have been taking place across towns in Ethiopia’s Oromia region. Some of these protests have turned violent and resulted in casualties. Some Western companies have suspended operations in most parts of Oromia region. Road travel was also disrupted in certain areas, affecting some Western private sector organizations with operations.

The general security situation in Oromia region is still volatile. Strikes and civil unrest continues in several locations. Ethnic clashes between Oromos and Somalis were reported in West Hararghe, Borna, West and East Shewa, and Northwest Shewa zones.

Since July 2017, the eastern and southeastern regions of Oromia have received large numbers of IDPs because of ongoing conflict between the ethnic Oromo and Somali communities along the border. This most recent escalation of violence is not uncommon along this troubled border region where ethnic and pastoralist/agriculturalist priorities have long been sources of tension; however, the scale of the violence and displacement is highly unusual.

The source of the conflict is mainly competition over scarce water, grazing and other resources. At times of drought, competition over resources was very common among the communities within Eastern Hararghe zone and across the border of the Somali region. Such competition lead to conflicts, which usually could be resolved through traditional conflict resolution mechanisms led by community elders. However, in September 2017, an extensive and protracted conflict broke out between the two ethnic groups, resulting in mass displacement of people, loss of life, and destruction of property.

Catholic Relief Services and its partner, Hararghe Catholic Secretariat (HCS) are engaged in a targeted response focused on the distribution of food, essential non-food items and education materials.

* 1. Terrorism Threat

A number of al-Shabaab operatives and other extremists are believed to be operating in/around the Horn of Africa. Since the July 11, 2010, terrorist bombings in Kampala, Uganda, for which the Somalia-based, U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization al-Shabaab claimed responsibility, there have been increased threats against public areas across East Africa. On October 13, 2013, a bomb exploded in a residential neighborhood of Addis Ababa. The bomb detonated prematurely and killed two individuals believed to be al-Shabaab members who had intended to attack Ethiopian soccer fans attending a World Cup pre-qualifying match. The government

released a November 2013 warning that Al-Shabbab intended to carry out attacks in Addis Ababa and other areas of the country.

**Security Risk Matrix**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Impact **⇨****RISK**Likelihood**⇩** | **Negligible**No serious injuries.Minimal loss or damage to assets.No delays to programs.*(1)* | **MINOR**Minor injuries.Some loss or damage to assets.Some delays to programs.*(2)* | **MODERATE**Non-life threatening injury. High stress.Loss or damage to assets.Some program delays and disruptions.*(3)* | **SEVERE**Serious injury.Major destruction of assets.Severe disruptions to programs.*(4)* | **CRITICAL**Death or severe injury.Complete destruction or total loss of assets.Loss of programs and projects.*(5)* |
| **Certain / Imminent***(5)* | **Low** | **Medium**Environmental Hazards | **High**  | **Critical** | **Critical** |
| **Very likely***(4)* | **Low**Petty Theft  | **Medium**Armed Robberies | **High** | **High**  | **Critical** |
| **Likely***(3)* | **Negligible** | **Low**Civil Unrest | **Medium** Ethnic Violence | **High** | **High** |
| **Moderately likely***(2)* | **Negligible***.* | **Low***.* | **Low**Road AccidentsHealth Hazards | **Medium** Road Block  | **Medium** |
| **Unlikely***(1)* | **Nil** | **Negligible** | **Negligible** | **Low** | **Low** |

# **GENERAL SECURITY RULES**

The maintenance of effective communication channels and routine information sharing are the most important precautions for avoiding security incidents and other emergencies. In addition, each staff member should take the following steps, regardless of location:

* **FSP review:** All staff members are required to review this manual and acknowledge this review in writing (sample form provided in the FSP) in order to gain a better understanding of general safety and security issues.
* **Registration with Embassies:** It is the responsibility of each international staff member or visitor (for longer than two weeks) to register with the consular section of his/her embassy within 48 hours of arrival in Ethiopia.
* **Proper Documentation:** All CRS staff are advised to keep their personal documents, including CRS/ET ID card in a safe but accessible place. Internationals should also carry a copy of passport with visa and valid national ID card and driver’s license. Clear copies of these documents should be kept in files at CRS and in staff residences at all times.
* **Security Focal Point:** At all times, CRS/ET has a designated Security Focal Point. An alternate team member is always designated in his/her absence:

Security Focal Point: Solomon Berhaneselassie, Security Advisor

Security Focal Point: Atli Moges, Head of Operations

Alternate Security Focal Point: John Shumlansky, Country Representative

## RESPONSIBILITIES

**Country Representative (CR)**

The CR has supervisory responsibility for the safety and security of all CRS /ET personnel and operations in the country program. Using guidelines established by EARO / HQ, the CR is responsible to establishes guidelines, policies, and procedures for all aspects of safety and security in the country program.

The CR has the final decision-making authority, and is responsible for appointing members to the Security Management Team and selecting the CRS/ET security focal point to manage the planning and implementation of CRS / ET safety and security program.

**Security Management Team (SMT)**

SMT is responsible for the management and supervision of the CRS /ET safety and security activities. The team makes recommendations to the CR regarding issues related to safety and security.

SMT consists of: *(pending final determination)*

\_ Head of Programs

\_ Head of Operations

\_ Deputy Head of Programs

\_ Chief of Parities

\_ Logistics Manager

\_ Administration Manager

Specific responsibilities of the SMT include:

\_ Making recommendations to the CR relating to security matters

\_ Establishing CR safety and security standards

\_ Reviewing CRS/ET Security Strategy as needed

\_ Reviewing and proposing CRS/ET Security Manual as needed

\_ Reviewing all aspects of programs to ensure compliance with CRS /ET safety and

 security standards

\_ Supporting the safety and security requirements of the PDP offices

\_ Providing guidance to PDP office staff as needed

**Security Focal Points (SFP)**

The FSP is normally a capable local staff designated by the CR to directly manage the operational and planning aspects of safety and security in consultation with CR and HoOPs. The SFP has full authority over safety and security in the field based on guidance from the CR

Specific responsibilities of the SFP include:

* Assisting the CR in all aspects of the management of safety and security of the country program
* Collaborating with SMT in assessing country program safety and security requirements
* Managing CRS /ET safety and security program in consultation with CR, HoOPs
* Monitoring security conditions and advise/inform the CR, and the staff before any field trip
* Provide security briefings for employees / visitors of CRS /ET Program
* Update Security Manual annually or as needed

## Key Contacts

All staff should carry a copy of the constant companion with them at all times or have the important contacts saved in their cell phones and a copy of the phone tree should be available in the office and residence.

## Incident/Accident Reports

All CRS/ET staff and visitors are required (by CRS HQ) to report any changes in the security situation and all security incidents and vehicle accidents, however minor, to the Security Focal Point. The SFP will report appropriate information to CRS EARO and HQ, and if applicable share this information to other NGOs, the UN and/or the US Embassy.

## Additional Safety Guidelines for Addis Ababa

Avoid walking or driving alone, particularly at night.

* Avoid wearing valuable, particularly visible jewelry or watches, or carrying items that might draw attention.
* Avoid unannounced/unscheduled public gatherings.
* Visitors to Addis Ababa should use CRS drivers, who may be made available during the day or night, as pre-arranged.
* If you have to drive alone, phone someone at a destination point and provide departure and estimated arrival times. If returning home alone, alert someone at your location that you are leaving and call him/her when you arrive home.
* At night ask someone to accompany you to your vehicle. Park in a well-lit, guarded area.
* In case of emergency/assault/robbery, DO NOT RESIST. Cooperate and give up your valuables. In Ethiopia, criminals are generally only likely to use force if confronted aggressively. If during business hours, call CRS/ET immediately. If after hours, the Security Focal Point or alternate, or Department Head should be contacted.
* Guards should announce each visitor to a residence or office. No unknown individual should enter the premises without permission.
* Carry some form of identification and a mobile phone if available.
* Avoid panic or reactionary behavior. ALWAYS USE COMMON SENSE!!!!!

# SECURITY LEVELS CLASSIFICATION

The following security levels have been adopted by the program.

Level One: Precautionary: Normal state in the areas where CRS operates in Ethiopia, with a moderate level of indirect threats described below but no exceptional tension or targeted threats against NGOs or CRS.

Level Two: Restriction: Increased level of tension and/or threats against NGOs, internationals or CRS

Level Three: Very tense: Generalized and serious increased tension and threats.

Level Four: Evacuation: Prohibitively insecure and threatening environment in areas of CRS operation

Level five: Hunker Down: Direct attacks against foreign citizens, US/orgs (including NGOs).

# DECISION MAKING MATRIX FOR SECURITY SITUATIONS

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Situation** | **Final Decision** | **In consultation with:** |
| Shift in security phase | Country Representative  | HoOps, HoP |
| Stopping/restarting activities/staff movement | Country Representative  | HoOps, HoP & Admin Manager |
| Evacuating international staff | Country Representative/HoOps | EARO RD Regional Staff Safety Advisor and HQ |
| Closing programs | Country Representative  | EARO/ RD, Regional Staff Safety Advisor and HQ  |

This line management is applicable for security decisions to**:**

* *Adopt* a Standard Operating Procedures and shift from one phase to another
* *Stop* or *Restart* activities/staff movement and evacuate the international staff
* *Withdraw* an employee if his/her behaviour is increasing the security risks to him/herself and/or others.

Annex 1: CRS/ET FSP, Standard Operating Procedures

### **Special Attention: Political Rallies or Demonstration**

CRS Ethiopia informs CRS staff and visitors that political demonstrations may occur without significant notice throughout Ethiopia. Such demonstrations may be organized by any party or group and can occur in any open space throughout the country. In Addis Ababa, applications for permits to conduct rallies are often requested for Meskel Square or Bel Air Field. Please remember that even public rallies or demonstrations intended to be peaceful have the potential to turn confrontational and escalate into violence. You should, therefore, stay alert and avoid areas of demonstrations. Exercise caution if in the vicinity of any large gatherings, protests, or demonstrations.

### **Staff Movement**

**Employee Locator for National and International Staff**

Full compliance with the CRS Agency Employee “Locator” is a critical part of CRS Ethiopia’s and the Agency security management systems. The Employee Locator is used to provide information for ONLY short-term visits or TDYs to a country that is not your official post of duty.  It should not be used to indicate transfers of assignment in process.

**Vehicles**

All are equipped with a regularly maintained first aid kit, appropriate tools, a spare tire and jack and two warning triangles. Vehicles used for travel outside Addis Ababa also include a shovel and a tow chain. Fuel, oil and water levels are checked and filled, regularly if not daily.

* Vehicles should be parked in direction ready for easy exit.
* All international and key national staff should know where spare keys are kept in the office.
* Vehicles should always have their fuel tanks at least half-full.
* First-Aid kit should at a minimum contain:
	+ Gauzes, tape and bandages
	+ Gloves
	+ Scissors
	+ Paracetemol/ibuprofen
	+ Oral rehydration salts
	+ Normal saline
	+ Antiseptic ointment,
	+ Antiseptic disinfectant (Dettol)

###

### **Documents to keep in vehicle(s) compartment**

* Discharge of responsibility form for non-CRS passengers
* Copies of all certificates concerning the vehicle (registration card, insurance stickers)
* Log sheets and Emergency Contact list.

### **Passengers**

* CRS staff, partners and individuals directly linked with CRS program activities are authorized to travel in CRS vehicles and covered by CRS insurance.
* Non-CRS passengers must sign a discharge of responsibility (Waiver Form).
* Transporting passengers not working for CRS or associated with Partner staff is expressly forbidden from riding CRS vehicles including the transport of passengers for hire. CRS vehicles are also forbidden from transporting armed personnel

### **Cargo**

* Staff are expressly forbidden from transporting cargo (such as charcoal, foodstuffs etc.) for commercial purposes in CRS vehicles under any circumstance.

**Road Travel**

Prior to traveling by road to visit CRS activities outside your area, consult with other NGOs, partners, and/or the UN. The following guidelines are to be followed by all CRS (national and international) staff:

* Policy requires a five-day advance notice for travel requests.
* Ensure that there is at least one fully charged mobile phone (or sat phone if appropriate) along with a charger and relevant contact numbers available in the vehicle.
* Perform a vehicle check before leaving.
* Bring along food and water in case you get delayed.
* After you depart your location, contact the CRS/ET office upon arrival and again when you plan to return.
* Only drive on roads that are used regularly by locals.
* Fasten your seat belt.
* If you have to change your predetermined route, advise CRS/ET Administration of the change.
* Travel outside the city after twilight is prohibited unless specifically authorized by the CR.
* Use a CRS/ET driver (as appropriate/available).
* In case of signs of danger along the route, inform CRS/ET Administration Unit immediately/ASAP, seek alternative route or return to point of origin.
* Any decision to travel to a new or potentially insecure area must be made in consultation with the SFP or alternate SFP. CRS staff should not travel for the purpose of ascertaining the safety of roads, nor should CRS participate in such trips.
* If you have to drive on potentially insecure or recently inaccessible roads, always use 2 vehicles.

**Checkpoints**

* When approaching and stopping at a checkpoint slow down and show that you are intending to stop at the checkpoint.
* If you are required to stop be polite, comply with reasonable requests made by the guards. (Asking for ID, where you are coming form and where you are going, the purpose of your trip and asking to search the vehicle are reasonable requests).
* Asking to ride in the vehicle with you is not permitted.
* Remember to stop any cell phone/radio contacts. It is advisable to take off sunglasses and remove unnecessary items from the dashboard.
* Your hands should be visible to the guards at all times. Reaching to your side to unbuckle your seatbelt could be construed as reaching for a side arm. If you have to unbuckle your seatbelt, make your intentions known to the guards, or make sure one of the guards can see you.
* Answer the questions directly and succinctly. Do not volunteer more information than necessary.
* Stay in the vehicle unless ordered out. If ordered out, stay by the vehicle if possible, and observe any search of the vehicles to avoid items being taken or illegal items being placed in the vehicle.
* Protest removal of personal items from the vehicle but do not resist. Do not argue with an armed person. Report the incident immediately to CRS/ET Administration, SFP or CR.

**Vehicle Accident Response**

In the event of a driving accident, take the following measures when possible:

* Assist yourself and other passengers to safety.
* Contact the Head of CRS/ET Administration, the SFP or alternate.
* Contact the local police/administration or NGO representatives in the area.
* If persons outside of your vehicle were affected, assess the risk of mob justice against you and determine whether it is advisable to offer to help them, according to your best judgment and depending on the current security situation.
* If the situation permits, get the full name of the drivers of other vehicles involved in the accident, as well as their driving license number, vehicle plate number and insurance carrier name and policy number
* Make sure to get the full name, badge number, and duty posting of any police personnel who are present at the scene, and try to get them to accompany you to the police station.
* In the presence of other CRS, local administration or NGO personnel, proceed to police station and file a report.
* Complete the Vehicle Incident or Accident Report Forms (depending on the circumstances) and submit it to CRS/ET Administration.

**Vehicle Accident Prevention**

The best way to respond to vehicle accidents is to prevent them by practicing general road safety and driving defensively. All persons operating CRS/Ethiopia vehicles are encouraged to use the following procedures:

1. Comply with Speed limits. The following speed limits apply to the different types of roads in Ethiopia:
* Inter-city highways - 60 kph
* Ring Road expressway – 80 kph
* Major arteries in Addis – 60 kph
* Minor paved streets in towns – 40 kph
	+ 1. Travel time table

Limit the extent of travel during the night and twilight hours, when visual function is limited. This includes departing for long trips early enough to reach final destination before twilight. The following destinations/departure points and corresponding departure times apply:

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| From | To | Dep. time | From | To | Dep. time |
| Addis Ababa | Adigrat | 06:00 am | Adigrat | Addis Ababa | 06:00 am |
| Addis Ababa | Mekelle | 08:00 am | Mekelle | Addis Ababa | 08:00 am |
| Addis Ababa | Dessie | 06:00 am | Dessie | Addis Ababa | 06:00 am |
| Addis Ababa | Dire Dawa | 06:00 am | Dire Dawa | Addis Ababa | 06:00 am |
| Addis Ababa | Emdibir | 2:00 pm | Emdibir | Addis Ababa | 2:00 pm |
| Addis Ababa | Hosanna | 06:00 am | Hosanna | Addis Ababa | 06:00 am |
| Addis Ababa | Kombolcha | 06:00 am | Kombolcha | Addis Ababa | 06:00 am |
| Addis Ababa | Alem Tena | 02:00 pm | Alem Tena | Addis Ababa | 02:00 pm |
| Addis Ababa | Meki | 02:00 pm | Meki | Addis Ababa | 02:00 pm |
| Addis Ababa | Nazareth | 03:00 pm | Nazareth | Addis Ababa | 03:00 pm |
| Addis Ababa | Wonji | 02:00 pm | Wonji | Addis Ababa | 02:00 pm |

1. Limit the duration of uninterrupted driving. On trips lasting over 2 hours, the driver should stop to rest for 15 minutes every 2 hours
2. Limit the number of long-distance travel days in sequence. On trips lasting over 2 days, an alternate driver should be among the passengers so that no driver shall be asked to drive longer than 16 hours more than 2 days in sequence.
3. Read the Ethiopian Driver’s Manual, (a translation to English is underway) and respect the rules.
4. Expect that other drivers will NOT obey the rules, and apply defensive driving – comply with speed limits, indicate latest time to hit the road for frequent itineraries, indicate how often drivers should rest on a long trip and you should also provide a measure to prevent that multiple day long distance driving be done.

**Air Travel**

Currently, Bole Airport at Addis Ababa is functioning normally with regular schedules of domestic and international flights. Delays are common, particularly but not exclusively, for domestic flights. Delays usually occur without formal explanation and can last anywhere from less than to an hour to most of day, before they announce the flight is cancelled.

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### **Radio Communications**

CRS/ET does not have any radio communication equipment, which the government bans for most non-governmental organizations. As an alternative either cell or sat phones (CR) are utilized.

### **Management of Offices and Residences**

**List of Equipment/ Inventory**

The Manager of each department has a list of all essential documents and equipment, and has assigned the selected items to specific individuals for removal in case of emergency such as evacuation due to fire or conflict. Department Heads have provided the SFP with a copy of this list. Additionally, a list of emergency equipment kept at International Staff residences is provided to each international staff member. The administration Department Manager is responsible to ensure that other Department Managers update their departmental lists as the Country Program’s inventory is updated.

**Naming a Security Officer per Household**

Each international staff member is considered Security Officer in his/ her own household, except in cases where he/ she spends a large amount of time traveling. In this case, the spouse is named as SO. An information packet for each household security officer is provided by the Administration Department, and will include items called for in the document “Security and Staff Safety: Guidelines for CRS Field Workers” (Sept. 1, 2000)

**Management of personnel concerned with security**

All persons employed as guards at CRS offices have been issued job descriptions. Additionally, adaptation of these job descriptions for residential guards employed by international staff members will be undertaken concurrently.

### **Staff Health**

For information related to health risks in East Africa and preventive measures, staff should consult the website of the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC): http://ww.cdc.gov/travel.eafrica.htm

All staff are encouraged to know their health status. All staff should be aware of his/her blood type, allergies, and immunization record, keeping track of when it is time for booster shots and new vaccinations. All staff should carry ID cards with emergency information. The CRS/ET Addis Ababa office has four first aid kits: One on each floor. All CRS drivers are trained in basic first aid. (First Aid Kit locations pertains to the old office—this information to be updated for the new office).

In addition, the CRS/ET office has clearly posted the number for SOS (emergency evacuation service) by the telephone of the Administrative Assistant to the Country Representative as well as the work and home phone numbers for the Regional Director and CRS HQ contacts.

**Malaria:** Even though Addis Ababa and much of the highlands are not malaria-prone areas, all staff should take the appropriate precautions for malaria when traveling to affected parts of the country (mostly located in the southern parts of the country). These include the following recommendations:

* Take prophylaxis medication when traveling to malaria prone areas
* Sleep under a treated mosquito net
* Wear pants, long sleeved shirts and socks after dusk
* Keep your office/residence mosquito free by covering water containers, keeping doors and windows shut at night, and routine spraying.

If you notice ANY symptoms, no matter how minimal, have a blood test done immediately. Some common symptoms include fatigue, headache, body aches, fever, chills, nausea, vomiting and diarrhea. Since the symptoms and stages can vary so widely, it can be difficult to tell if you have malaria. The key to avoiding serious complications is early detection, followed by appropriate treatment. Never wait, because the complications can develop very rapidly.

**Blood Transfusions -** Given the poor standards of hospitals in Ethiopia, international staff should be careful to follow proper precautions should an immediate blood transfusion become necessary. St. Gabriel Hospital and Hyatt Hospital (0116614250 or 0116181096) have links with the Red Cross Blood Bank, which is coordinated by Dr. Girma (0115159231). While donors are selectively screened, their blood is only tested for HIV. However, before releasing any units, the bank will conduct additional tests for hepatitis B and some STDs especially for expatriates. The policy, however, is to replace the number of units you take with new donations, presumably from friends, family or colleagues. Maintaining a supply of plasma is not an option, as it needs to be kept in closely-monitored cold storage.

### **Other Issues**

***Mob confrontation against a vehicle or individual away from the Office***

The best way to deal with mob confrontation is to avoid it. Accordingly, all staff should be aware of mob activity before traveling to or from the office. When they are aware of mob activity, the Security Officer and the Administration Department will monitor the situation by local radio and notify staff. In such situations, staff should limit travel to only essential movements. Advance or delay movement or alter routes to avoid areas commonly used for demonstrations, such as:

* 1. Meskel Square including Stadium area
	2. Addis Abeba University including college of commerce area
	3. Kotebe College of Teacher’s Education
	4. High school areas
	5. Market places

Await word from the Security Officer (through the telephone tree) before returning to normal activities. If staff members hear of a situation but are away from a violent area, they should not proceed to the office or the violent area. They must remain in their residence or a secure location, activate the CRS phone tree and await instructions. Afterwards, they must fill out the Security Incident Report Form.

If a mob approaches you despite these precautions, change your course immediately and move to a place of safety. If you are in a vehicle where traffic does not allow you to move your vehicle away, be prepared to abandon the vehicle if your life of safety is threatened by remaining with the vehicle.

CRS national staff can participate in local politics; however, they should do so as private citizens and not in the name of CRS (or when wearing clothing or markings that identifies themselves as CRS employees).

**Fire Preparedness**

In the event of fire, immediate action must be taken to prevent the loss of life, the destruction of property, equipment and critical information. The person in charge of a fire emergency is the SFP or an alternate SFP. All CRS/ET Addis Ababa guards have been trained by the fire brigade of Addis Ababa on how to proceed and use the necessary equipment to extinguish a fire.

* Appropriate fire detection and extinguishing equipment has been procured for the CRS/ET office and vehicles. Fire extinguishers are staged in the following locations: each floor in the main stairwell.

In addition, CRS/ET will install one fire extinguisher in each international staff residence. Extinguishers are checked for pressure every 6 months or before expiry for refilling. Each department head has a list of all essential documents and equipment, and has assigned the selected items to specific individuals for removal in case of fire evacuation. Department Heads have provided the SFP with a copy of this list.

If you discover a fire and it is not out of control:

1. Attempt to extinguish it using available equipment.
2. Communicate the incident to the SFPs or alternate SFP.
3. Notify all personnel present in the vicinity.
4. Notify the Fire Department, if necessary.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Fire Brigade IV: | 011 156 7004  |
| Other Addis Fire Brigades  | 011 276 9146 |
|  | 011 466 3420  |
|  | 011 442 5563  |
|  | 011 663 0373, 011 663 1998 |
|  | 011 434 0096 |
| Red Cross Ambulance Service:  | 907 |
|  |  |

If you discover a fire and it is out of control:

1. Contact the Fire Department.
2. Quickly lock any confidential materials in the designated filing cabinet.
3. Turn off electrical equipment and lights.
4. Collect essential personal possessions and designate responsibilities.
5. Close all windows and doors.
6. Assist any visitors to safely exit the building.
7. Evacuate the building.
8. Proceed to the designated assembly area (the flower garden, until otherwise specified) and await further instructions.
9. The SFP or an alternate SFP will deal with authorities and designate another staff person to check that all staff present are accounted for, as per the daily attendance record.
10. SFP instructs guards to ensure that the compound periphery walls/exits are secured to prevent unauthorized access to the building. Only permit entry by authorized, non-fire fighting personnel in order to conduct a rescue or an official investigation.

**Bomb Threat Response**

In the event of a bomb threat, immediate action must be taken to ensure the security of CRS personnel and property. The SFP, or the alternate SFP, is in charge of conducting the response to a bomb threat. The bomb threat may be transmitted by letter, telephone or in a package. CRS guards, drivers, and secretaries will receive training on how to detect possible bombs and the proper procedures, as described below, for dealing with such threats.

If a CRS office receives a bomb threat via the telephone:

1. Receiver of the call should record details of call.
2. Receiver notifies SFP or alternate SFP.
3. SFP or alternate SFP makes a rapid check around the office and instructs each member to check his/her own personal area. If anything suspicious is found, DO NOT TOUCH IT, MOVE IT, OR DISTURB IT IN ANY WAY.
4. SFP, or alternate SFP, decide whether to evacuate.
5. Contact Police and Fire Departments

Kebele Police (CRS/ET office): 011 259 3338

 National Police: 911

 Fire Brigade: 011 156 7004

6. Forward completed Bomb Threat report to SFP.

If a CRS office receives a written bomb threat:

1. The person who receives the note should immediately give the document and envelope to the SFP or alternate SFP, and provide any details concerning its receipt.
2. SFP or alternate SFP decide whether to evacuate.
3. Contact Police Department

 Kebele Police: 011 259 3338

 National Police: 911

If a CRS office receives a suspected letter/package bomb:

1. DO NOT OPEN, CRUSH OR THROW AWAY.
2. Leave the room immediately
3. Call SFP or alternate SFP immediately.
4. SFP and/or alternate SFP decide whether to evacuate.
5. Contact local authorities to remove the item and investigate.

Kebele Police (CRS/ET office): 011 259 3338 National Police: 911

If evacuation is ordered:

1. Quickly lock confidential materials in the designated filing cabinet.
2. Leave windows and doors open. Do not operate any switches.
3. Assist any visitors to safely exit the building.
4. Evacuate the building.
5. Proceed to designated assembly area and await further instructions.
6. SFP checks that all staff present that day are accounted for, as per the daily attendance record.

Once a building has been evacuated, staff should not reenter it until it has been thoroughly searched and is deemed safe to reenter by the SFP (in consultation with local authorities).

**Response to Armed Intrusion**

In the event of an armed intrusion while staff members are present:

* Stay calm and cooperate. Do not argue or resist. Hand over all items requested.
* If abducted or taken hostage, do not speak about politics, military or security issues. If compelled to do so, make neutral or agreeable statements.

After the incident:

1. Contact the SFP or alternate SFP immediately.
2. Contact US Embassy Security Officer.
3. Contact Ethiopian police.
4. Fill out Security Incident Report Form.

### **Hostage Situation**

* If you do become involved in a hostage-taking situation, then do not resist. Obey the person with the weapon. Avoid sudden movements that threaten the captor(s).
* If the hostage situation is ongoing then do try to build a relationship with your captor(s). Avoid controversial subjects likely to upset the hostage takers. Emphasize your humanitarian status but do not give away personal information about yourself, your family, or your colleagues. Be careful not to push too much and irritate the captor(s). You will need to assess the situation and determine if developing a relationship will help or increase your risk.
* Consider the implications which any escape plan(s) may have on the other hostage(s) who remain. In the event of a violent assault to free the hostage(s), lie on the floor with your hands above your head. DO NOT try to assist. If you are active in this situation, you are likely to be mistaken for a hostage taker and shot.

Security Levels Classification

The purpose of an emergency security plan is to establish a set of contingency procedures for the management of program operations, as well as to prepare for the possible evacuation of international staff and the wellbeing of national staff, to the extent possible, should the security situation in the country worsen significantly. The decision to evacuate personnel, whether for medical or security reasons, should be taken only when the risk of remaining on location becomes greater than the risk of exposure during the evacuation process.

The organized evacuation process for the international staff team encompasses five potential levels of security. These levels also have implications for CRS national staff as well as CRS assets. The responsibility of initiating each of the levels rests with the SO or, in his/her absence, the alternate SO. It is important to note that during this process, any international staff person has the right to request for an immediate evacuation for themselves and their family if they do not feel comfortable with the security situation.

Application of security levels can be applied to the entire country, or limited to certain regions, depending on the nature of the increased threat. When applied to certain regions, the implications are mostly for national and international staff travel and programming activities. When applied to the entire country (particularly Addis Ababa), these implications are expanded to include the potential evacuation of international staff and their families, as well as possible suspension of country program activities. Downgrading of the security level will only take place after thorough analysis and consultation. The SO will inform both the Regional Director and CRS/HQ (Baltimore) whenever the security level has been upgraded or downgraded in any part (or all) of the country.

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| **Level** | **Description** | **Consequence** | **Action to be Implemented** |
| Normal(LEVEL I) | This is the default level, which represents, more or less, normal operations of the CRS/ET program. Threat potential to CRS staff at this level is assessed to be low. Normal international travel precautions apply.  | Accompanied post, interns and fellows are welcome. For national staff and the office as a whole, regular policies and procedures apply. | Staff are required to follow general security procedures as described herein, including guidance on vehicle accident response, fire preparedness, bomb threat response, response to armed intrusion, mob violence response, road travel, and general safety precautions for Addis Ababa.International staff and HR are required to maintain updated work/residence permits. |
| Restrictive(LEVEL II) | This level is declared when the Security Focal Point perceives an increased threat potential, albeit still at a relatively low level, to CRS/ET staff. Possible tripwires:* Terrorist action threatened at international or American community in Addis Ababa
* Poetical demonstrations
* Increased incidence of NGO vehicles or staff victimized by road banditry.
* US Embassy in Addis Ababa issues a security warning to its citizens in country.
 | CRS business is not unduly affected, but the general country situation indicates that travel should be restricted to some regions or hours of the day for security reasons. Accompanied post, interns and fellows are welcome with special attention to security precautions.Program activities may continue as normal or with some limitations.  | However, staff should intensify inter/intra-agency communication as well as security information collections and reporting.* CR will determine whether travel is prudent given safety and security restrictions.CRS staff may be restricted from travel to some parts of the country, depending on the nature of the threat.
* Meetings are called with relevant organizations in Addis Ababa (such as UN agencies, coordinating NGOs and embassies). Special attention must be paid to addressing emerging rumors and ensuring that clear and open channels of communication are in operation.
* Travel Officer should secure open-ended plane tickets to Nairobi for all international staff and dependants, should an immediate departure from the country become necessary.
* All staff begins to procure supplies of essential foodstuff, fuel supplies, review security of residence, routes children take to school and routes to the office.
* Evacuation plan is reviewed and revised as necessary by the Security Focal Person and/or alternate. Core staff on location review their roles and responsibilities and remind themselves of emergency procedures.
* Security Focal Point ensures that the safe area and vehicles are prepared and have appropriate items in store.
* Each international staff member checks his/her evacuation bag to verify contents and procures any missing items. (Appendix VI: Evacuation Bag List)
* Logistics and Administration Departments update the inventory of equipment, warehouse stocks and other supplies, taking note of the equipment or materials that might be useful in an evacuation process or for national staff use in ensuring their security (such as foodstuffs or communication devices). Staff need to be aware of the potential for some stock items to create a security risk by attracting the attention of looters.
 |
| Tense(LEVEL III) | This level is declared when the threat potential to CRS/ET staff and/or other INGO staff rises to the level where a phased evacuation of international staff and their families is considered, should the situation deteriorate any further. Possible tripwires:* Multiple terrorist attacks occur against international community in Addis Ababa.
* Serious political unrest and mass demonstrations
* US Embassy orders a departure of all of its non-essential staff
* Foreign ground forces begin to make significant advances into Ethiopia.
* NGOs increasingly become targets of crime and banditry
 | CRS normal business may be curtailed by security incidents occurring on a regular basis, and/or in our areas of operation. The post is likely to be declared unaccompanied, either temporarily or permanently. Interns and volunteers should not be assigned, as a general rule if the country is permanently in this category. | All non-essential staff and dependents should evacuate at this stage. Program activities would probably be decreased to a minimal level of operations.* Program Department to review its projects with a view to modifying or reducing activities, as appropriate.
* Travel restrictions and curfews for CRS staff are activated, as appropriate. Travel will be limited to essential business travel only. CRS’ policy for Travel to High Security Risk Countries will be applied. CRS’ Chief of Staff must authorize all extra-regional visitors in addition to host country CR and RD.
* All staff notifies Security Focal Persons, or alternate, of movement outside of workplace or residence, remaining close to communication devices at all times.
* Security Focal Person, or alternate, assigns specific tasks and responsibilities to each key staff member in the case of evacuation, such as designating an officer-in-charge, clarifying the reporting structure, designation of staff tasked with keeping the Country Representative, Regional Director and CRS/HQ informed, etc.
* Admin Department to coordinate potential use of CRS vehicles to assist those national staff that want to relocate their families to more secure locations (e.g. either inside or outside of Addis).
* Admin Department will enter negotiations with airlines and air charter companies to ensure availability of air transport for evacuation.
* Family members of international staff and/or non-essential international staff are either moved to a more secure location, or evacuated as per instructions from the SFP.
* All staff is encouraged to hide extra supplies for later use, in case the supplies you have on hand are forcibly taken during movement from one part of Addis to another or during evacuation.
* Finance Department to make arrangements for two months' salary payment to national staff, so that payment can be made immediately should evacuation become necessary.
* Finance Department to discuss and identify possible procedures for the transfer of funds to maintain office operations if feasible.
 |
| Evacuation(LEVEL IV) | This level is declared when normal CRS business severely curtailed because the security situation at the national level is unstable, travel to CRS program sites is unsafe, orthe threat potential to CRS/ET international staff is deemed too high for them to remain in country and to carry out their duties effectively. Evacuation procedures are implemented and program activities either cease or reduce to an absolute minimum. Travel to the country is prohibited. Possible tripwires:* US Embassy and/or UN recommend the immediate departure of all foreign nationals from Ethiopia for security reasons.
* CRS property or staff is the direct or indirect target of repeated acts of lawlessness
* The threat of heavy fighting, attacks, looting etc interrupt program operations or expose staff to unreasonable risks.
 |  | Identical to Level III plus:Emergency evacuation is planned and implementedDaily phone checks are conducted if the phone are still workingMinimum daily check in with EARO (RD or delegate) if possiblePreparation for hunker down are put in place  |
| Hunker Down(LEVEL V) | This level is declared when CRS business severely curtailed due to a natural catastrophe or sudden onset of violence. Travel to CRS program sites is unsafe, orthe threat potential to CRS/ET international staff is deemed too high. Evacuation cannot be done because it is too risky to travel in and out of the country. Possible tripwires:* Evacuation is considered too dangerous
* All employees remain in their residences (lock down)
 | Food and water availability becomes scarceIt is too dangerous to venture into the streetCommunication is hampered or non-existent | Identical to level IV plus:Evacuation of all international staff remain in place to be carried out as soon as situation permits e.g. As soon as Bole airport or roads to Djibouti or Moyale are passableCommunication channels are kept if possibleEARO and HQ are informed of the situation every hour if possible |

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| Level 2: Normal/RestrictedThe following measures are taken once Level 2 has been declared for Addis Ababa:Alternate routes to airports and land borders should be checked and selected depending on the particular security context. Outlying areas near to the city or areas within the city that are relatively safe are identified in case national staff should need to move from their neighborhoods for security reasons. |
| Level 3: Very TenseIn addition to those listed in Level 2, the following measures are taken at Level 3:Logistics and Admin Departments develop a plan for safeguarding program resources (such as commodities, physical inventory, keys, computers and vehicles) should an evacuation be necessary. Part of this task includes confirming which partners would be capable of and willing to safeguard CRS resources, and deciding how and when to transfer such resources. Items will only be handed over to partners if it is determined that they will not endanger them in any way. |
| Level 4: EvacuationIn addition to those outlined in Levels 2 and 3, the following measures are taken at Level 1. Security Focal Person, or alternate, maintains regular communications with the Regional Director and HQ regarding initiation of evacuation stage.
2. Designated Finance Department staff will receive two months salary reserve for distribution to the national staff before evacuation of international staff.
3. The designated officer-in-charge works with the other key national staff to ensure staff safety by maintaining communication and transport links where feasible.
4. Security Focal Person, or alternate, determines evacuation mode, when international staff should gather in safe area with evacuation bags, and when/how they should be transported to embarkation point.
5. CRS program activities cease and/or minimal operations are maintained if feasible.
6. Staff distribute/protect program resources as planned and if feasible. All CRS stickers, flags and other identifications should be maintained if it is deemed to improve security, or removed if deemed to compromise security.
7. Security Focal Person, or alternate, activates specific evacuation procedures in coordination with other members of the American or international community.

**National Staff:**CRS generally does not evacuate national staff unless they are at personal risk due to their affiliation with CRS or they have been assigned to field offices away from their official residence. Important risks to consider when analyzing agency’s ability to evacuate national staff:* Evacuation may be interpreted as a political act thus endangering all concerned
* CRS may be unable to ensure staff safety at check points and border crossings largely because national staff do not enjoy the protection attributed to foreign nationals by the UN, international embassies and often by combatants.
* Insufficient logistical means to support the number of people to be evacuated
* Ethical dilemma of regarding who to be evacuated (just the staff person, immediate family or extended family)

However, CRS’ inability to guarantee national staff evacuation does not preclude its moral responsibility to assist national staff with other measures to protect their safety under evacuation conditions. The Country Representative or designate is responsible to meet with national staff to discuss options for CRS to support them to the extent possible. |

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| Level 5: Hunker Down (i.e., can not evacuate safely)When the threat to CRS/ET international staff is high but evacuation is deemed imprudent or would expose staff to too great a risk, a “hunker down” or "stand fast" phase should be implemented. During this phase, operations would most likely be suspended temporarily. When and where possible, international staff and dependents move to the safe area for an undetermined period of time, awaiting further instructions. CRS international staff should not remain alone at this point, if at all possible. Regular telephone communication or radio checks should be continued. Do not directly or clearly discuss sensitive security information, such as a location's name or resources by phone or over the radio. Travel to the country is prohibited |