



MALI COUNTRY PROGRAM

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FIELD SECURITY PLAN

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CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES

faith.
action.
results.

ACRONYMS

AQMI:	Al Quaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
CMA:	Azawad Movement Coordination
CR:	Country Representative
CRS:	Catholic Relief Services
CRS/Mali:	Catholic Relief Services / Mali Program
FLM:	Front de Liberation du Macina
GOM:	Government of Mali
SM:	Security Manager
SO:	Security Officer
HoP:	Head of Programs
HQ:	Headquarters of CRS in Baltimore, MD, USA
IED:	Improvised Explosive Device
MINUSMA:	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MUJAO:	Mouvement pour l'Unité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest
NGO:	Non Governmental Organization
HoOp:	Head of Operations
UN:	United Nations
VBIED:	Vehicle Board Improvised Explosive Device
WARO:	West African Regional Office

SECTION I. INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE OF THE PLAN

This document is written for both the national and international staff of CRS on duty in or on visit to Mali. It provides visitors and staff with essential security information.

All employees and visitors of CRS in Mali have the responsibility to promote security and must observe all rules and procedures contained in this security plan.

CRS/Mali requires that the protocols contained in the Field Security Plan are strictly observed. Any deliberate violation, or attempt to circumvent these protocols exposes the employee to disciplinary actions and may lead to his/her dismissal.

This security plan is developed to ensure your security, that of your colleagues, and the proper operation of CRS activities.

All CRS employees must understand the key concepts of security management described in the Security Manual of CRS' *Safe and Secure: Directive for the Safety and Security of Personnel*.

When necessary, the security plan shall be updated on a biannual basis.

All CRS staff should be informed of the key security management concepts described in the first two sections of the *Safe and Secure* manual. These sections are:

- ◆ *CRS Security Management: Key concepts and directives*
- ◆ *Security Strategies: CRS opt-in approach.*

A copy of this manual is available within the Security Department at the CRS Mali office and should be read by all employees and visitors.

"Security Management is a system, not a document. It begins with each officer within the organization. Our behaviors, actions and communications can contribute to an improvement of security and of the image of the organization, or expose us to the greatest extent."

- Chapter 1, Safe and Secure: Personnel Security Guidelines/CRS Security Management, Key Concepts and Guidelines

"CRS recognizes that our work often imposes extreme demands upon staff in complex and risky conditions. We take all reasonable measures in order to ensure the security and welfare of our staff and their families."

- Section 1, B1: Personnel Security and Protection: Directives for CRS Field Workers

Golden Rules for the Protection and Security of Personnel:

- ◆ CRS responds to violence with peace. CRS staff shall by no means bear arms.
- CRS reserves the right to withdraw staff from any situation deemed to be too dangerous and fully recognizes that any officer has the right to leave a place that s/he considers too dangerous for her/his personal security.
- No property is worth life; never leverage personal security in order to keep a physical or intangible good.
- Always remain in good mental and physical health in order to reduce vulnerability to disease or stress.
- Wearing safety belts saves lives.

SECTION 2. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The Republic of Mali, a former French colony known as The French Sudan, became independent on September 22, 1960. Its population, 90% of which consists of small farmers, is unevenly spread over an area of 1,239,700 km². Mali has witnessed several rebellions in the North, led primarily by Touaregs who comprise nearly 10% of the population yet cover 60% of the country's northern desert area.

During 2012, Mali lost control of more than half of its territory to separatist armed groups and jihadist terrorists. These occupying forces have destroyed infrastructure, physically violated women and children, massacred soldiers and civilians, and displaced a massive portion of the population.

From the French military intervention in 2013 to liberate the jihadist-occupied areas, to the signing of the peace agreement between the Malian government and the armed groups in May 2016, the security situation has worsened. Malian armed groups have splintered and AQIM and Almourabitoune terrorist groups have invaded radical indigenous groups, including the Liberation Front of Macina (FLM) and ANSAR DINE. New groups keep arisen.

In May 2015, a peace agreement has been signed between Malian armed Groups led by CMA (Azawad Coordination Movement) and the central Government.

However, the delay of the application of the peace agreement and the weakness/absence of the state to effectively ensure the security of persons have negatively contributed to the upsurge of insecurity and the expansion of terrorism.

The Kidnapping of "Soeur Gloria" in February in Koutiala corroborate the expansion of terrorism in the South. The targets have been Westerners, mainly French nationals and citizens of its allies who have been engaged in

the stabilization of Mali. The attack of “Campement Kangaba” resort which occurred on June 18, 2017 claimed by the FLM terrorist group underscored the group’s expansion both in the central and the south of Mali and its capacity to injure, create panic, and undermine the Western security system in Mali through asymmetric attacks.

The increasing insecurity risks has led the Government of Mali to reextend the State of Emergency until at least 31 October 2018.

Despite the expansion of terrorism to the southern regions, CRS strives to expand its program in the North in order to develop proximity management. These efforts include the 2015 opening of a sub-office in the region of Gao and the opening of a sub-office in Timbuktu in February 2016, both of which were undertaken in order to better serve communities in need at the grassroots level.

The CRS country program in Mali began in 1999. The central office is located in the capitol, Bamako, while the regional office in Ségou (in the Mopti Region) operates the two sub-offices in Gao and Timbuktu. These four offices are comprised of a total staff of around 179 permanent employees, including 17 international staff.

CRS and its local partners focus on proximity management by utilizing the opt-in approach. The opt-in approach entails implementing programs which are accepted by the local population and authorities in the different intervention areas. Intervention areas include the regions of Gao, Timbuktu, Koulikoro, Mopti, Sikasso, Segou with the potential for all regions in Mali except Kidal, where chronic insecurity currently precludes opening an office.

According to OCHA, the NGO opt-in strategy worked relatively well in the North of Mali until the end of 2013. Since that date, radical elements and bandits have become more aggressive towards humanitarian actors who work in the three northern regions and the Mopti Region. The radical jihadists affiliated with AQIM, FLM or MUJAO, intentionally target NGOs and the exposed of Caucasian international staff as they can be exploited for kidnapping or public relations purposes.

However, most armed groups do not specifically target humanitarian workers. They do not wish to disrupt the essential services their communities are receiving from NGOs, including education, primary health care, and food assistance.

These armed groups, however, will hi-jack any vehicle that is entering into an area that they wish to keep “grey” in order to discourage access to information and to local populations that they are trying to control. They indiscriminately target all those who have resources including trucks, cars, phones, laptops and money.

SECTION 3. ASSESSMENT OF THREATS, VULNERABILITY AND RISKS

The presence of many different armed groups in Mali makes the security situation complex and highly volatile, particularly in the North. The armed groups actively oppose the efforts of MINUSMA forces and humanitarian agencies attempting to reach vulnerable populations in their operating areas. They continue to traffic heavy weapons, drugs and other contraband items.

CRS defines risks as: *risk = threat x vulnerability*

Vulnerability is the degree of impact that any threatening event could have on staff, assets, or programs.

Vulnerability factors which put CRS at risk include:

- The location of the office or intervention areas;
- Identity (U.S. Agency, Catholic);

- Value of property;
- Compliance with appropriate adequate safety and security measures;
- Interpersonal skills of the staff;
- The way the staff and the programs are perceived;
- True or perceived affiliations (partners, local authorities, Government donors, local non-state actors);
- Training of the staff / orientation / skills.

Any possible event that can lead to CRS staff being injured, CRS property being lost or damaged, and CRS programs becoming delayed or suspended is a threat. The main threats generally faced by CRS staff in intervention areas are:

➤ **TERRORISM**

The majority of terrorist attacks use IEDs and VBIEDs to target Barkane, MINUSMA, the Malian Army, military headquarters, and other symbols of the government in Mopti and the three northern regions. These attacks generally happen on roads used by military troops either very early in the morning around 5:00am, or in the mid-day.

Since March 2015, Mali has witnessed a resurgence of terrorist groups in the Central and Southern regions of the country. The attacks against La Terrasse Restaurant in Bamako in March 2015, Le Byblos in Sevare in August 2015, and the Radisson Blue Hotel in Bamako in November 2015 exemplify the expansion of terrorist acts to regions previously deemed safe. Furthermore, these acts specifically targeted Westerners.

In 2013, Belmoktar became head of the Almourabitoune group that was born from the merging of a branch of AQMI and the former MUJAO. In 2015, the MUJAO branch made a declaration of allegiance to the Islamic State. A few months later, Belmoktar resigned from Almourabitoune in order to return to AQIM in 2015. Thus, the group will get closer to Ansar Dine in order to achieve its aim to kidnap Westerners.

The recently formed Liberation Front of the Macina (FLM) represents a different vision, one focused on attacking the symbols of western education, modernity and government administration in central Mali.

The common goal of all of these groups are to oppose and attack westerners and their symbols. Their logistical support and technical support is likely to have come from Libya, a source of weapons and dormant cells of fanatic fighters who are technically well trained.

Although NGOs have not been specifically targeted since 2013, they have often been collateral victims.

➤ **ARMED HOLD-UPS**

Hold-ups or armed attacks by criminal gangs are very common along main roads in Mali's northern regions. In the north-west area of the Timbuktu Region, the risk is very high. In the Goundam Circle of this region, there have been a multitude of indiscriminate attacks since 2015. The proximity of this area with the Mauritanian border, which acts as a safe haven for criminal gangs and terrorists, is one of the main reasons for the resurgence of these incidents.

Additionally, the resurgence of hold-ups and armed attacks on rural roads to steal vehicles in the city of Gao is a high risk for humanitarian actors in the region, including CRS staff. The threat is real and volatile, and because of the dynamics of the situation, impossible to forecast. CRS could reduce its vulnerability, however, through updating security instructions and increasing faithful compliance. The Gourma Rharous Circle in the Timbuktu

Region and the Nara Circle in the Koulikoro Region have also experienced armed attacks, presenting the same risk for CRS staff.

➤ **CONFLICTS**

The proliferation of armed groups operating across a large geographical area has led to conflicts amongst them. Inter-community conflicts amongst the dispersed armed groups in CRS' intervention zones have created barriers in the agency's ability to reach the most vulnerable populations.

➤ **CRIMES/BANDITRY**

The majority of crime in Mali affecting NGOs is that of pickpocketing, handbag "rippers", theft, harassment, vehicle attacks, and road blocks set up for robbery or extortion. Robberies and burglaries are common in Bamako, Segou, Mopti and Sikasso. Violent crimes and banditry are becoming more and more common in Mali making armed robberies, burglaries, and vehicle attacks a constant possibility. Although the risks faced by NGOs vary according to the different regions, the risk of crime or banditry involving NGOs is heightened in the North. These crimes occur frequently due to the inability of security forces to intervene in the regions of the North where there is anarchic proliferation of organized armed groups, criminal gangs and self-defense militias.

➤ **KIDNAPPINGS**

Kidnappings of foreigners and tourists for ransom was not uncommon in Northern Mali, with armed groups bankrolling their operations by kidnapping mostly Europeans, whose governments were known to pay ransom. Kidnappings have been less frequent in the past three years, the risk has been increase with the kidnapping of the French woman (Sophie Petronin) in Gao in December 24th 2016. Then the current risks of kidnapping are high with the last known in February 7th 2017 case in Koutiala circle in the center of Mali of a Colombian nun who has lived in the village of Karangasso for many years. The explicit threats to target Westerners, increases the risk all parts of Mali.

➤ **ROAD SAFETY**

Road accidents remain one of the most likely security incidents to affect CRS staff. Poor road conditions, congested traffic in urban areas, especially Bamako, poor driving skills and poorly maintained vehicles and motos cause frequent and often serious accidents in Bamako as well as outside of the city. All drivers of CRS vehicles must apply defensive driving techniques and all CRS staff driving motorcycles must wear helmets always.

SECTION 4. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF CRS PERSONNEL: THE CHAIN OF EMERGENCY ORDERS

The collection and analysis of security information is the responsibility of the Security Manager and the Security officers (the focal Points). They are also responsible for providing advice and guidance about behaviors to improve risk management.

This section is a brief overview of the roles and responsibilities of personnel in case of an emergency. The diagram below indicates the level of involvement of each staff member in the process:

➤ **The CRS/Mali Country Representative (CR)**

- All decisions related to security are the responsibility of the CR or her/his delegate.

- The CR will determine the security levels of the country, by area. S/he is responsible for:
 - enforcing the security plan;
 - ensuring that it is understood and constantly updated to reflect the current needs;
 - deciding on the suspension of activities, the temporary closure of offices, and the relocation/ resettlement of an office;
 - deciding if the staff must be evacuated and giving the evacuation order after consulting with the country senior management team and the Regional Director. Her/His decision is irrevocable and must be observed by all.
 - ensuring that the security management requirements of the national and international staff comply with CRS standards.

➤ **The HoOp (Bamako)**

- S/he is responsible for:
 - preparing and coordinating all logistical issues related to the evacuation;
 - monitoring the evacuation at the sub-office level.

➤ **The Security Manager**

- S/he is responsible for:
 - updating the security plan, the constant companion, and the standard operating procedures;
 - briefing all new staff and visitors on the security situation;
 - analyzing and submitting incident reports (Annex V);
 - collecting and analyzing information in cooperation with other humanitarian agencies and local authorities;
 - coordinating administrative aspects with other agencies in order to facilitate an evacuation;
 - ensuring that the entire staff observes the security plan;
 - supervising the security officer based in Sevare , Timbuktu and Gao

➤ **The Security Officers in Mopti and Timbuktu**

O They are responsible for:

- following-up on the security in the areas of intervention;
- coordinating the evacuation logistics for the Mopti and Timbuktu office.

➤ **Logistics Manager**

O S/he is responsible for:

- supervising the implementation of security procedures at CRS warehouses;
- training the staff on the fundamentals of security management regarding food and warehouses;
- informing the staff of their responsibilities during emergencies;
- i. making sure that the warehouses are equipped with necessary security equipment;
- i. periodically checking the security equipment in the warehouses.

• **The Head of Vehicle Fleet**

- S/he is responsible for:
 - i. ensuring the maintenance, control and regular follow-up of vehicles;
 - i. ensuring the adherence to procedures and rules concerning the use of vehicles.

• **National and International Staff**

The observation of security procedures is an individual and collective responsibility. Staff must recognize that they work, at times, in a complex and dangerous environment. Newly recruited staff must receive a security briefing and become aware of the security environment.

- **Individual Responsibility:** Each CRS Mali officer should regularly assess the level of risk in order to ensure that measures taken are acceptable. Any officer may refuse to participate in a mission in Mali if s/he considers that it may present unacceptable risks for her/his security. Likewise, any international employee who considers that her/his security is no longer assured in Mali may leave the country. The means and the time of this departure will be determined by the CR in order to ensure that it is safely done.
- **Collective Responsibility:** The individual behavior of each officer may have an impact on the security of the rest of the staff, as well as on the image of CRS. Therefore, failure to follow the security procedures is a serious misconduct.

- **Responsibility to Report Incidents:** All CRS Mali staff and visitors are required to report all incidents (whether major or minor) or embarrassing incidents for CRS, its staff or its partners to the Security Manager, HoOp, and CR. The standard form for incidents (included in the annexes) must be completed to report a case. This form must be sent directly to the Security Manager for review before it is submitted to the CR. Once reviewed, the document will be sent to the Security RTA and a copy to Deputy Regional Director for Program Quality and the Regional Director. In order to effectively respond to any threat, it is imperative that all staff respect a high level of information sharing by reporting all incidents, rumors, etc. Call the CR or the security Manager in order to share any information related to security.

“Security incidents must always be reported to the Country Representative, even if they are potentially embarrassing for the employee or the organization”

- Overseas Security and Protection of the Personnel: POL-HRD-INT-0005, version 1.1

REMINDER: CRS reserves the right to withdraw staff from any situation that is considered dangerous for her/his own safety.

ANNEXES

A. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

Security instructions consist of preventive security measures that must be implemented daily in order to reduce the risks.

- **General Security Rules**

The following basic information and recommendations will help reduce the risk of being harassed or persecuted by local authorities. Personal security is above all else, the main responsibility of each person.

- Money: There are numerous ATMs in major Malian cities which will give out local currency for up to US\$ 500 at a time for a fee. Restricting the amount of cash one carries is always wise. Unlike in many other countries, US dollars are not readily accepted in lieu of local currency.
- Outings: By nightfall, in locations where there is no electricity, expatriates should restrict their movements as much as possible.
- Public discussions and telephone conversations: International staff should avoid discussing the political and/or military situation of the country in public places or during a phone conversation.
- Compromising documents or publications: International staff should avoid holding written documents, publications and/or messages coming from social media related to the political or military situation of the country.
- Registration with embassies: International staff must register with the Embassy of their country of origin if they are to be permanent staff in Mali.

- **Security at the Office**

CRS Mali's offices are quality buildings with low profile that provide a safe and conducive work environment. CRS Mali cautiously and pro-actively manages a low-profile posture, with limited branding in Bamako and no branding in Mopti, Timbuktu and Gao. General safety and security guidance includes:

- Fire hazard and response: None of CRS Mali's office buildings constitute a major fire risk, as most construction is concrete. The Bamako office is equipped with a centralized emergency water hose system, and fire extinguishers on each floor. The Sevare, Timbuktu and Gao offices are equipped with fire extinguishers. In the case of fire, staff will evacuate the building via the emergency exits, and congregate in the parking area. Emergency exits in the Bamako and Sevare and Timbuktu office are installed and visible.
- Non-CRS visitors: No visitors can enter the CRS building without first being checked by security guards. Bags are checked for weapons and other potentially hazardous items. All visitors to CRS offices are given a visitor's badge upon entry to the building, so that they are easily identified. In case of an attack on an office building or in the vicinity, panic rooms with reinforced doors and windows are available in each office and guest house, with hibernation kits.
- Terrorist event: In case of a terrorist even in or around an office or guest house, all staff are instructed via email, SMS and in the Bamako office a sirene to hunker down in the panic rooms. Dry runs are conducted regularly.

- **Movements of Employees**

Outside of their residences, international staff should carry the following documents:

- A copy of their passport with a visa
- A driver's license
- A cell phone with credit and charge
- An evacuation SOS insurance card
- "The constant companion" or the list of security staff phone numbers
- The equivalent of at least \$30 in local currency (approximately 15,000 CFA)

- **Security Briefing**

When a new visitor or employee arrives, s/he must meet the Security Manager for review of the Security Plan and he will provide updates on the security situation. The manager of the vehicle fleet will test the employee to assess if s/he has the driving skills and abilities to become authorized to drive. The manager of the vehicle fleet will provide a briefing on all existing politics and procedures regarding CRS vehicles. No new employee is authorized to drive CRS vehicles without a valid driving license and a driving test approved by the CR. The new employee is invited to provide suggestions and comments on the content of the orientation process within 15 days.

- **Communication**

- Mobile phones: CRS staff must have a working mobile phone with SIM cards (for both Orange and Malitel networks for redundancy) for daily communication. Each employee must have a list of all employees' phone numbers. The list is available on the SharePoint. Contact numbers of key people, specifically the CR, the HoP, the Security Manager, the Head of the Vehicle Fleet, and any relevant focal points must be in all phones provided to visitors. A mobile phone containing 10,000 CFA credit and a charger will be provided to each visitor and all TDY staff members when they arrive at the airport. Executives, international staff and visitors must always keep their mobile phones switched on and well charged. The phone communication tree operates following the organizational chart. The flow of information requires supervisors to communicate with their direct supervisees using SMS messages. Each recipient must acknowledge receipt before s/he sends the message to her/his supervisees. (The Tree will be in the Annex)
- The SMS System: The Security Manager will be the reference point for all security information. S/he will send and receive information by SMS; thus, employees should be prepared to receive security updates via text messages.
- Satellite Thuraya Phones: Employees who travel in areas where the signals of mobile phone networks are weak or do not exist must request a Thuraya Phone from the Security Manager in Bamako or from the Security Officer/Assistant in Sevare or Timbuktu, respectively. They can be used in the offices of Bamako and Sevare and Timbuktu when staff are required to stay in the office because of insecurity. Also, all staff who have a Thuraya in their custody shall test their functionality once a month by calling their own cell phone and making a connection. The Security focal persons in each office will organize an annual surprise training on the use of the Thuraya. The Country Representative has a Thuraya at the CR residence at all times in case of emergencies, with the number posted on SharePoint.

- VHF Radios: CRS/Mali has multiple operating VHF radios, including in Sevare, (for the office and the guest house), Timbuktu, Gao and in Bamako, held by the Security Team. These VHF operate on the UN office communication channel for the sharing of security information. Other than the sharing of security information, the VHF radios will be used to coordinate movement in case the local GSM communication networks are out of order. Relevant staff who are expected to be able to use VHF radio shall be trained on its usage once a year.
- Internet: The offices and guest houses in Bamako, Sevare, Timbuktu and Gao possess constant internet connection to monitor and communicate security concerns.

▪ **Office Management**

The resurgence of unemployment and the weakness of the public security system has led to a high risk of incursion and armed theft in offices and residences. To mitigate these residual insecurity risks, CRS Mali has contracted the services of a security company for its offices and warehouses in Bamako, Sevare, Timbuktu and Gao as well as the international staff residences. The following security measures are currently implemented in CRS offices by the security company with four guards present each day, two of whom work during the day and other two during the night. The following apply to guard duties:

- Mobile phones must be switched on when they are on duty.
- Any incident or suspicious event must be reported to the Security Manager or the Security Focal Point of Sevare, who will inform the HOOPS and CR.
- All visitors are required to present an identity card and identify the person they are to meet.
- Announce the visitor before he/she enters the CRS office.
- Systematically inspect the visitors' bags.
- Escort visitors to the reception.
- All visitors must be accompanied by the visited person.

▪ **Residence Management**

- All residences of CRS international staff have guards patrolling 24 hours a day. Outdoor lights around the house must be switched on from sunset and remain on until the morning.
- Residences must be equipped with generators to ensure the lighting in the event of power failure.
- Guards of the residences are required to inform the resident and the Security Manager of all unusual events (suspicious vehicles, gatherings of unidentified individuals, etc.)
- At night, international staff must close and lock all doors and windows.
- Any improper behavior of a guard must be immediately reported by the international staff to the Security Officer in order to ensure quality control by the security company.
- The security manager (Bamako) and security staff in Sevare and Timbuktu conduct quarterly surprise night visits to guards to ensure they perform their duties.

▪ **Staff Health**

The following directives are of importance when it comes to the health of CRS staff:

- Water from the public supply system is safe for human consumption. Yet, visitors on a short mission (TDY) or small dependent children are highly advised to drink mineral water.
- Raw vegetables must be well cleaned with bleach or permanganate before consumption.

- Malaria is prevalent throughout Mali. Staff should protect themselves against mosquito bites by using insecticides and mosquito nets and by covering exposed skin, particularly at sunrise and sunset. During short visits and for small dependent children, malaria prophylaxes should be considered.
- Exhaustion significantly increases the risk of contracting diseases such as malaria. It is recommended that staff rest enough, particularly when they start to feel stressed or tired.
- International staff must have a vaccination against Yellow Fever. Immunization against Typhoid Fever and Hepatitis A and B are also highly recommended.
- In case of medical emergency, the best option for international staff is to immediately go to the Pasteur Clinic, or the Clinic of Professor Ali Guindo located in Badalabougou ([Location of the clinics](#)). If an ambulance is needed, it is recommended to refer to the list of emergency numbers on the constant companion.
- The CR must be informed of any medical problem as soon as possible following the logic, *sooner rather than later*.
- All international staff are subscribers to the SOS evacuation insurance that covers all necessary evacuation through South Africa, Europe or any other destination.
- Evacuation is normally done on the recommendation of a local doctor. International staff must always have on them their SOS insurance card. International SOS can also be called to get medical advice even if an evacuation is not being considered.
- Local staff of CRS Mali benefit from medical care at clinics affiliated with a medical insurance company contracted by CRS Mali.
 - For routine medical assistance, several healthcare institutions exist in Bamako, but they are limited within the rest of the country. Staff should immediately alert their supervisor or another member of the CRS staff and try to see a doctor.
 - International staff are responsible for all medical care that is locally paid, and will then seek reimbursement through their insurance agency (AETNA).
 - The following medical institutions are recommended within Gao, San, Timbuktu, Mopti and Bamako:

GAO		
Regional Hospital	(+223) 76334780 (+223) 62071664	Dr Maiga
Reference Centre	(+223) 21789357 (+223) 73146434	Ali Tembely
TOMBOUCTOU		
Regional Hospital	(+223) 61750044 (+223) 79189889	Dr Karim Dembele
Health Centre of Reference	(+223) 76112267	Dr. Mamadou Zoumana Mariko
SAN		
Colombe Clinic	(+223) 66690517 (+223) 77534311	Dr Flakeke David Diallo
Lafia Clinic	(+223) 77607030 (+223) 64558418	Dr Fidel Dembele
Santoro Clinic	(+223) 76418444	Dr Sidibe Dian Namory
Pharmacy	(+223) 21372042 (+223) 69737111	Dr Amadou Sanogo
MOPTI (Sevare)		
INPS/Sevare	(+223) 21420010	Dr.Mamadou Diallo
Hospital/ Mopti	(+223) 21430186	Dr. Boubacar Diallo
Regional Centre of Traditional Medicine Bandiagara Bandiagara	(+223) 21420006	Dr. Noukoro Pierre
Health Centre of Sevare	(+223) 21222207	Dr. Coulibaly Issouf
BAMAKO		

Ali Guindo Clinic, Badalabougou East	(+223) 20222207	Prof. Ali Guindo
Medical Social Centre of France	(+223) 20225072	The Reception
Farako Clinic, Badialan III after the Richard Bridge	(+223) 20225387 (+223) 20231111	Madam Richard
ALDI Clinic Niarela, Titi Niare Road	(+223) 20211450 (+223) 75249777	Dr Abdel Kader Coulibaly
Gabriel Toure Hospital, Medina-Coura	(+223) 20222712 (+223) 65266813	Madam Kaddiatou Dembele
Point G Hospital	(+223) 2025002 (+223) 76429698	Ousmane Sadou Maiga
Pharmacy of the 2 nd Bridge (below King Fahd bridge)	(+223) 20229641 (+223) 79418188 (+223) 66751354	Dr Dia

■ **Medical Evacuation**

- **IN-COUNTRY:** In Mopti, Gao or Timbuktu Region, where the sub-offices of CRS are located, there are no quality health service because of the failure of the health technical platform and the lack of skilled health personnel to address certain illnesses. Therefore, it has been agreed that humanitarian air services (ECHO FLIGHT and UNHAS) will facilitate the medical evacuation of CRS staff based on the recommendation of doctor in cooperation with the CR. In worst case scenario, MINUSMA flights may be mobilized.
- **OUT-OF-COUNTRY:** In case of a medical emergency, SOS is the medical evacuation insurance provided to the international staff and official visitors of CRS Headquarters (HQ). SOS is available to provide medical advice at the below addresses:
 - SOS CRS N ° member #1MMS1062
 - The Call Centre (Alarm): Paris, France +33 (0) 1 5563 3155
 - Replacement alarm centers:
 - London, United Kingdom: + 44 (0) 20 8762 8008
 - Philadelphia, United States of America: + (1) (215) 245707
 - If SOS services are engaged, international staff must inform the CR who will contact the HQ of CRS.

B. SECURITY LEVELS – TRIGGERS AND INSTRUCTIONS

Level	Status	Indicators	Movements of the Staff	Changes to the Program
1	Normal/ Quiet (Level I)	Characterized by normally low crime levels and military/political activity in the city.	Activities and movements can be carried out without any concern as well as the normal operation of various services.	No change.
2	Latent/ Restricted (Level II)	High crime, harassment / military activities or political events.	A curfew will be introduced; reduced movement in the outskirts of the city or in some areas of the country.	Possible localized movement restriction.
3	Very tense (Level III)	Generalized unrest and/or harassment against civilians and humanitarian personnel. Some shots heard, scenes of looting, thefts and disruption of communication systems.	Movements during the day are kept to the strict minimum. All night movements forbidden.	Suspension of visits to the sites on the field, except in case of an emergency. Any visit requires the approval of the region and HQ. Regular dissemination of the sitreps on security. Suspension of travel/assignment to the field. Arrangements for evacuation.
4	Evacuation (Level IV)	Unrest that directly threaten the security of CRS staff. Resurgence of scenes of looting and robbery with regular armed clashes in the streets. Telephone communications are completely disrupted.	Any movement is prohibited, except when going to the point of evacuation under appropriate escort.	Systematic suspension of all programs. Decision to evacuate and establishment of rules for evacuation. Regular phone communications with the region and HQ.
5	Catastrophic/Hunker down (Level V)	Too dangerous to move. Evacuation not possible.	All staff stay where they are and remain in communication.	All activities are suspended. All suspended phone communications with the region and HQ.

Current Security Level and Restrictions:

Currently, all regions of Mali are at level III. Even though visits to Mali are not prohibited, field visits inside Mali require approval depending on the area. The following table summarizes the restricted areas:

Areas	Level of Security	Curfews	Restricted areas requiring the approval of the Regional Director and/or the CR
Bamako and all regions of the South	III	N/a	North of Segou for international staff
Mopti Region	III	9:00 pm - sunrise	Douentza for all staff
Koulikoro Region	III	9:00 pm - sunrise	Nara for all staff
Cities of Gao and Timbuktu	III	7:00 pm - sunrise	Approval of the CR for international staff, but not for national staff
All regions of Timbuktu and Gao	III	7:00 pm - sunrise	All areas outside the cities of Gao and Timbuktu
Kidal	III	7:00 pm - sunrise	The city of Kidal and all its locations

Restrictions within Bamako:

Restrictions in Bamako are reviewed and updated quarterly, or following a major security event. While for national staff there are no formal restrictions. The standing security protocol (through Q4 of FY16) for international staff is included as Annex 1. General guidelines for staff are:

- Avoid dark and isolated areas during the night because they offer the cover of darkness to criminals helping them to commit their crimes.
- It is highly discouraged to walk alone after 10:00 pm. Military checkpoints are randomly erected in Bamako at the end of the evening, especially on weekends or following terrorist events. At night, international staff must carry proper identification (passport or driving license).
- International staff who wish to move privately can contact the taxis company address below:

- **Pro Barka NIANG**
Commercial
 Taxi Plus VIP
 Tél. +223 20-29-16-16; Cell. +223 75-11-26-14
infotaxiplus@gmail.com



Regional Restrictions:

- The approval of the CR is required before any official movement of the national staff towards restricted areas. The approval of the Regional Director is necessary for all staff in these restricted areas who are on mission in Mali but not from CRS Mali. The CR and the Regional Director must approve all missions for international staff to restricted/regulated areas. Any non-WARO staff visiting Mali require CR, RD and VP OverOps approval via delegated authority from the security cell in HQ.
- During missions, the national staff can stay with relatives or friends if they consider their home safe. They can also stay in CRS guest houses.
- The CR must approve in advance all accommodations for international staff on official mission in restricted areas before staff may stay there. (e.g. hotel, UN/NGO guest house, etc). The maximum length of stay is two nights or three days for Timbuktu and Gao, and two weeks for Mopti region. International staff don't currently travel to Kidal.

C. RAPID ASSESSMENT OF RISKS MATRIX

Threat	Vulnerability		Risk Assessment	New Actions	Risks
Note each threat on a separate line	Strength (factors and security instructions that reduce CRS vulnerability)	Weakness (factors and security instructions that increase CRS vulnerability CRS)	(Current)	To continue to mitigate the risk	(After the action)

D. EVACUATION PLAN

Emergency evacuation procedures for staff to come to Bamako, or for staff in Bamako to leave the country include:

- The decision to temporarily evacuate the international staff from a location in Mali is generally taken by the Country Representative (or his/her delegate), in consultation with the Regional Director and the Security Team at HQ.
- The Security Team at HQ, however, may provide a contrary opinion to the recommendation of the CR as far as evacuation is concerned.
- The triggering factors for international staff evacuation generally include:
 - Explicit threats against Western targets and westerners by armed groups operating in the North
 - The kidnapping of one or more foreigners in Bamako or in the cities of Mopti, Tombouctou or Gao.
 - The intended explosion of more than one explosive within one month by a presumed rebel or rebel sympathizer, near an installation of the Government of Mali, a diplomatic mission, a commercial business attended by expatriates and/or international NGOs.
 - The confirmed presence of more than 25 armed rebel fighters 50 km from Bamako.
 - The armed conflict between 25 or more armed rebels and Malian security forces 50 km from Bamako.
 - CRS employees who feel that their life is in danger can make a personal decision for self-evacuation. The CR must be immediately informed when this occurs, or as soon as possible. An evacuation can also be directly determined from the CRS HQ.
- If total evacuation of the international staff is determined, a careful analysis will be carried out in order to evaluate the possible evacuation mode and routes.
- The gathering place in case of an evacuation must be the offices of Bamako, Sevare, Timbuktu and Gao, unless otherwise specified. The evacuation shall take place either by air or road. If the evacuation is by plane, CRS will arrange the transport means to the airport. If the evacuation is by road, arrangements shall be undertaken by the CR the HOOPS, Security Manager and Fleet Officer in coordination with other national programs, when appropriate.
- Evacuation by road may cause a departure to Guinea or Senegal from Bamako, Burkina from Mopti, Gao or Timbuktu, or Niger from Gao. To Mauritania from Timbuktu is not advised. The CR will identify the safest way to do so and will ensure that the drivers of CRS and the employees are able to understand and implement the applicable security and safety-procedures. The international staff should have visas with multiple entries to the neighboring countries: Côte d'Ivoire, Morocco.
- In the case of an evacuation, arrangements related to the national staff and the operations of the office are detailed in the CRS Security Manual (Directive for the Safety and Security of the Personnel) and the contingency.

E. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR FIELD VISITS

- These comprehensive standard operating procedures evolve depending on the volatility of the security context in the different project implementation zones:
- CRS' general policy is to avoid armed escorts. However, there may be rare occasions when staff may be required by US Embassy RSO, the UN or local authorities to join them. This would likely be in the event of a mass evacuation from an area under attack, or during VIP field visits. This must be approved first by the Regional Director or HQ.
- Planned routes must be submitted to the Security Manager so s/he can obtain all relevant notifications and updates from INSO and MINUSMA.
- Security information from INSO, UNDSS, local partners and the NGOs operating in the area should be obtained.
- A communication plan to monitor movements during the missions should be submitted before movement takes place.
- If necessary, rental vehicles and a local driver outside of the town are permitted.
- Only share the travel plan with the mission team.
- International staff must carry their passports with them.
- A mission order must be submitted for approval at least a week before travel.
- Departures from Bamako must take place very early in the morning in order to maximize travelling time and to ensure timely arrival at the destination.
- The Manager of the Vehicle Fleet and the drivers are responsible for ensuring that the vehicles that must go on mission in the field have been fully checked before departure.
- The required equipment for the vehicle is the responsibility of the drivers prior to departure, including well-stocked first aid kits.
- For the duration of the trip, the Head of Mission must maintain communication with her/his immediate supervisor, the Security Manager and the focal point of the office in Mopti / Sevaré or Timbuktu at least twice per day, at 09:00am and at 05:00 pm.
- An armed person is never permitted to enter a CRS vehicle.
- Thuraya phones should never be used in the presence of the military, armed groups, or MINUSMA.
- Military convoys should never be followed.
- Badges should always be worn both in and outside of the office.
- Weekend travel in areas where the risk of attack is high should be avoided.
- Projects should be implemented with local partners to mitigate risks in intervention areas.
- Curfew hours should be known and adhered to.
- Travelling in vehicles equipped with CODAN and a flag should be avoided in high risk areas.

- Phones should be programmed with a text message to alert the office of your situation in case of emergency (example: “I’ve just been kidnapped”)
- The Security Manager will make sure that the staff who use the Thurayas have received appropriate training to use them effectively.
- Each Head of Mission using the Thuraya is responsible for its maintenance. Adapters for cigarette lighters are available to ensure that Thurayas are always charged.
- Cell phones should possess both Orange and Malitel credit to mitigate difficulty with cell phone network coverage.

ANNEX 1 - Standing International Staff General Security Protocol.

General:

All of Mali remains **Agency Security Level III.**

Travel to Mali:

For CRS WARO staff, any travel to Mali by non-Mali staff requires advance approval of the Country Representative (CR) and WARO Regional Director (RD).

For CRS staff based *outside of WARO*, or other visitors traveling to Mali from outside the WARO region, the CR, RD and the CRS Global Security Team (as delegated by VP OverOps) must all give advance approval.

All travel approvals (for all staff regardless of location) must be obtained at least 1 week before the planned arrival date, and will be considered only if a detailed SOW and in-country travel plans are provided for consideration. All visitors must update the CRS Employee Locator on CRS Global.

Travel in Mali:

International staff in Mali have relative freedom of movement for work related travel. International staff not based in Sevaré can travel to Sevaré, with CR approval, and spend up to two weeks there. Lodging must be in the CRS guest house. International interns are not allowed to travel to Sevaré or farther north.

On a case by case basis, international staff can travel by air to Timbuktu and Gao. The pertinence of these visits as well as the up to date security context will be evaluated by the Security Manager and the CR, and RD approval must be obtained. No international staff can stay more than 2 nights in either Timbuktu or Gao.

Curfew:

There is no curfew in Bamako. In Sevaré, a 9 PM until sunrise curfew applies. In Gao and Timbuktu a 7 PM until sunrise curfew applies.

Thursday nights & Fridays:

All international staff are instructed to restrict movements on Thursday nights and Fridays. Multiple major terrorist events in Mali in the past 12 months (La Terrace, Byblos, Radisson Blu, Timbuktu MINUSMA base) took place on a Thursday night or Friday. The January 2016 attack in Ouagadougou, claimed by the same terrorist group as many attacks across Mali also took place on a Friday.

High profile locations including Badala Hotel, Radisson Blu Hotel, the Sleeping Camel, Grand Azalai Hotel, Da Guidos, Amandine, supermarkets Azhar/Shopreate/Fourmis, Rue Blabla in Badalabougou, and all of Hippodrome (including Comme chez Soi, Taxi Bamako, Poularco, BlaBlaClub, etc) are **off limits on Thursday night after 6 PM and Friday all day**. When in doubt, please look at this [map](#) to see which locations and areas (including Hippodrome and Rue Blabla in Badalabougou) are restricted.

HIPPODROME:

Outside of Thursday night and Fridays (when it's off limits all day), Hippodrome remains off limits *at night* (sundown) until sunrise, every day of the week.

HEIGHTENED RISK:

The following locations are identified as at *heightened risk*, especially at night. If you must go to these locations – on a day other than Thursday or Friday – maintain situational awareness at all times, and decide to leave when many foreigners are present. This is not an exhaustive list:

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Da Guidos | 2. Badala Hotel |
| 3. Amandine Shopreare | 4. Supermarkets Azhar, La Fourmis, |
| 5. The Sleeping Camel | 6. SukhoThai |
| 7. Comme chez Soi | 8. Rue Blabla in Badalabougou (map) |
| 9. French Cultural Center <i>patio</i> | 10. Apaloosa |
| 11. Onomo Hotel | 12. Radisson Blu Hotel |
| 13. Grand Azalai | 14. Hanadi Hotel |
| 15. Casa du Fleuve Hotel | |

Mass/Church:

Security measures at the Cathedral are quite good, however, remain cautious on religious holidays. The Roman Catholic Church in Badalabougou (close to CR residence) is low key with high acceptance. When in doubt or in need of information, discuss with Security Manager and/or CR.

Personal staff trips out of town:

For any day-trips or overnight recreational trips out of town, please request security clearance from the CR and Security Manager (Sidibe) at least 48 hours in advance. Requests may be denied based on a security evaluation. Normal communication protocols (check-ins) remain in place for any leisure travel outside of Bamako. No authorization is needed for *daytrips* to Campement Kangaba, but yes for trips to Siby. Any travel recreational travel north of the town of Ségou is prohibited.

Notable locations that did not make this list of restrictions for daytrips are the Parc National and Zoo in Bamako, BadaLodge and Campement Kangaba. If you want to spend the night at Campement Kangaba or BadabLodge, do request security clearance from the Security Manager and CR 48 hours in advance.

Lodging:

Any visitors coming to Mali in principle stay in the CRS Guest Houses, whether in Bamako, Sevaré or Timbuktu. Your DSPN will be charged a fair share fee per night you stay there. The Bamako Guest Houses are safe and comfortable for any staff (national and international). Hotels are only a secondary option, and for Bamako, we use only Villa Soudan in Badalabougou close to the CR residence. Badala Hotel, Masseley, Hanadi, Sleeping Camel are *not* an option.

Communications:

Every CRS international staff and visitor must keep his/her cell phone on, with him/her at all times. Mali based international staff have both a CRS provided Orange and Malitel SIM. Phones should have sufficient credit at all times to be able to make emergency calls, or respond to security SMS. If for whatever reason your phone number changes, be sure to inform the CP, especially your supervisor, HOOPS, Security Manager, and CR.

Readiness:

It is always a good practice to have a *hibernation kit* and *snatch-bag* at your residence. The hibernation kit should contain sufficient drinking water, food, batteries, flashlight, etc, to see you through 1 week of hibernation at your residence. All CRS offices in Mali have hibernation kits as well in the conference rooms of the office buildings and the guest houses, which are also the Safe Rooms with reinforced doors and windows. Your snatch-bag should contain all your


important documents (yellow card, passport, etc), some cash (US\$, Euros, CFA) as well as any critical medication, etc, that you would need in case of a very sudden departure.

Finally, as always, you yourself are best able to *reduce your exposure to security threats*. Adhere to the above security restrictions, and continue to exercise caution, maintain situational awareness at all times, and avoid locations where foreigners come together, especially MINUSMA, Serval, Barkhane, EU training mission or other foreign police or armed forces in uniform.

Be safe,

Niek (Tel Orange: +22376409300)

E. L'arbre de Communication



* PMs appellent le responsable de MEAL pour son equipe

** Les staffs basées à Bamako seulement ; les membres du dept. basées aux sous-bureaux sont dans les autres arbres de communications.

Faith. Action. Results.

Annexe F: Security Incident Report Form

Security Incident Report Form – For internal use only

Attention:

Reported by:

Name:

Position:

Country Program:

Telephone contact:

Email contact:

Date of report:

Type of incident

A few words in order to classify the incident – i.e. mugging or traffic accident or harassment at military checkpoint, etc.

⇒

Description of incident

Date:

Time:

Location: (draw on verso or attach a map if necessary)

What happened: Key information should include: who is the victim (s) and condition of the victim (s). Who perpetrated, weaponry used, apparent affiliation and post-incident actions of perpetrators...

Action taken

By police/security forces, by local authorities, by CRS. Who was informed. Inquiry...

Impact on security & safety

Consider the victim (s), the team, local partners, beneficiaries, Country Program, the agency's image...

Lessons learned and proposed changes in security management and procedures:

